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ABSTRACT 
 
  
 This paper presents a brief overview of Angola’s international trade and the 
prospects for diversification on the export side as well as  reactivation of traded goods 
production to replace the current near total reliance on imports for all consumer and 
producer goods.  It is striking that trade policy per se is not the most important barrier to 
achieving these goals – rather, the most important are the poor state of infrastructure in 
the aftermath of the long civil war, the poor conditions for doing business, and the 
chronic problem of real exchange rate appreciation due to large inflows of oil and 
diamond receipts. 
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Introduction 
 
 It is perhaps common for economists when thinking of international trade in Sub 
Saharan Africa to jump to the conclusion that the typical country is insufficiently 
integrated into the world economy and therefore should try to promote a greater degree of 
involvement with the global marketplace.  Such a preconception would be misplaced in 
the case of Angola – Coastal regions are virtually 100% integrated with the world 
economy and these areas dominate the aggregate statistics that are reported for economy 
wide performance.  Nevertheless, there remain large parts of the interior which are 
virtually divorced not only from the world economy but from the larger national 
economy as well. 
 
 So, any effort to “further integrate” Angola into the world economy must come 
with very huge caveats.  First, the issue isn’t so much one of increased integration as it is 
of trying to achieve a very different structure of integration.  And it is also important to 
use a rather different typology in the Angolan case as compared to what is typically used 
in such analyses.  Normally, one would speak of export sectors and import sectors.  In the 
Angolan case it is more important to speak of the supply or production side and the 
demand side.  This is because it may well be the case that Angola continues to be nearly 
100 dependent on oil exports for the foreseeable future.  But it may nevertheless make 
significant progress toward increased production of traded goods even though those 
goods may not be actually exported. 
 
 This is because Angola’s coastal regions are not only nearly 100% dependent on 
oil revenues on the production side; they are also virtually 100% dependent on imports to 
satisfy demand for almost every single consumer item needed from food to machinery.  
Though this has changed somewhat since the signing of the peace accord in 2006 it is still 
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the case that Luanda and other coastal areas depend far more on imports for goods than 
on domestic production.  Indeed, one would not be far off base in viewing the coastal 
economy as an enclave isolated from its own hinterland but well connected to the rest of 
the world.  Thus, the problem is not so much integrating Angola with the world economy 
so much as it reconnecting the coastal oil-fueled production/consumption enclave with 
the economy of the rest of the country. 
 
 One could well ask why we should bother with even trying to do this.  If oil is 
such a lucrative sector why not simply depend on it and let the non-oil sectors wither?  
There are two reasons not to pursue such a “Kuwaiti” strategy: 
 
1.  Oil revenue, though large and expected to grow substantially larger over the next few 
years, will not last indefinitely.  In fact, even the most optimistic projections of 
production and prices predict a peak between 10 and 20 years from the present time.  
That means a child born today will spend his or her entire economically productive life in 
an economy where the oil sector is declining. 
 
2.  The benefits of oil revenue have been extremely concentrated in a very small part of 
the population.  The vast majority of Angolans get none of the benefits and many are in 
fact harmed due to the adverse macroeconomic distortions caused by large inflows of oil 
(and diamond) money.  Indeed, almost two thirds of Angolans rely either directly or 
indirectly for their livelihoods on agriculture, which is a sector that is very exposed to 
competition from imports made artificially cheap by oil revenue-induced appreciation of 
the country’s real exchange rate. 
 
 The extent to which the real exchange rate has appreciated is shown in Figure 1 
below.  It can be seen that the current level of the index shows that the profitability of 
domestic production of traded goods is in effect only about 40% of what it was in January 
of 2001.  This is perhaps the biggest obstacle to the reactivation of trade exposed sectors 
in Angola.  Every farmer wishing to produce maize for the coastal urban market has been 
effectively taxed  over the past year by the real appreciation.  To date, farmers in the 
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interior have been protected by virtue of their very isolation.  In addition, casual evidence 
indicates that they are still competitive in the inland provinces even at current exchange 
rates, but this will change if inflation continues while the exchange rate remains stable.  
Manufacturing in coastal cities is already in a precarious situation given the lack of 
transportation barriers for import competition together with the still poor state of utilities 
and other services necessary for production. 
 
  
Figure 1 
Real Exchange Rate:  Kwanza vs. US Dollar
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 This reactivation is the only feasible way to ensure that growth over the short to 
medium term is shared by the bottom half of the income distribution.  This diversification 
should occur primarily in the agricultural and some light manufacturing sectors which 
were once a mainstay of the Angolan economy and which still retain the potential to 
replace imports in a cost effective manner. Given the competition from cheap imports 
there is a strong presumption that the most likely candidates for the near term are traded 
goods whose physical qualities (e.g. perishable, bulky goods such as fruit and vegetable 
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crops) make long distance transport from abroad expensive. The challenge to policy 
makers is to implement a set of interventions that can rehabilitate the physical and 
institutional infrastructure needed to achieve these goals. 
 
II. Trade and Growth Performance 
 
 Angola’s exports account for  72 percent of its GDP, and are heavily dependent 
on oil and diamonds. In recent years, these two products have amounted to an average of 
about 93 and 6 percent of total merchandize exports, respectively (Table 1).  Items such 
as stones, sand, fish, etc make up the remaining one percent.  With limited refining 
capacity, almost all exported oil is crude oil1.  
 
 Angola imports almost everything, including products that the country has a 
comparative advantage in producing. Merchandise imports being about 30 percent of 
GDP, trade account generates a large surplus averaging 40 percent of GDP (Table 1).  
This is offset by payments for services related to investment in the oil sector and interest 
charges on large short-term external debt. The current account generates a deficit or 
surplus depending on the price of oil.    
 
 Almost half of Angola’s exports are shipped to the US and a quarter to China (all 
crude oil). The EU accounts for about 20 percent of total merchandize exports (Table 2).  
With regard to the sources of imports, the EU has the largest share at about 50 percent 
(Table 3), followed by South Africa (13 percent) and the USA (10 percent).   Exports of 
both oil and diamonds are projected to increase substantially in the coming years.   
 
 Angola has a relatively open trade regime with a rating of 3 on the IMF’s trade 
restrictiveness scale ranging from zero to 10, 10 being the most restrictive. The simple 
average of applied most favored nation (MFN) tariff is 17 percent2. The ad valorem tariff 
                                                 
1 Oil is exported largely under long-term contracts with particular countries.  This is usually done 
with oil-backed loans which commit oil production to the repayment of the loans. 
2 A new tariff regime was introduced in March 2005. The details of this regime were not available 
to us at the time of writing. Some of the expected changes are as follows: reduction of the 
maximum rate from 35 to 30 percent; increase in tariff rate for products that Angola has 
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comprises 6 bands: 2, 5, 15, 20, 25, and 35 percent. Tariff rates for agricultural and food 
products are 5 percent or less providing inadequate protection for these products. An 
additional fee of 2 percent is charged for all imports to cover clearing costs, raising the 
average MFN rate to 19 percent. A consumption tax that varies from 2 to 30 percent is 
also levied on both imported and domestically produced goods. 
 
Table 1:  Trends in Merchandise Trade 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 US $ (000) 
Total Exports 3753 4993 4768 3825 4829 7927 6881 8030 9486 
Total Imports 1734 1930 2316 2047 2055 2023 3238 2886 4161 
Trade Balance 2019 3063 2452 1778 2774 5904 3643 5144 5325 
 Percent of GDP 
Total Exports 74.5 66.3 62.1 59.3 79.3 89.5 72.6 71.4 71.9 
Total Imports 34.4 25.6 30.2 31.8 33.7 22.8 34.2 25.7 31.5 
Trade Balance 40.1 40.7 31.9 27.5 45.6 66.7 38.4 45.7 40.4 
 Composition of Exports (percent) 
Crude Oil 90.4 91.1 89.2 85.9 85.1 88.9 88.9 90.5 94.0 
Refined Oil 3.1 2.2 1.5 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.9 
Diamonds 4.4 5.1 6.9 9.2 11.5 7.7 8.2 6.3 3.2 
Others 2.1 1.6 2.4 2.9 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.5 0.9 
          
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade, Comtrade 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
comparative advantage; reduction of tariff rates for raw materials, and intermediate and capital 
goods; and, elimination of tariff on exports.    
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 Table 2:  Destination of Exports (percent) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Economic Union 21.6 19.3 14.3 17.0 17.0 17.7 26.3 26.4 13.4 
     France 2.4 2.9 3.8 2.9 2.0 4.7 9.7 7.9 7.3 
North America 64.0 59.9 62.2 64.4 53.2 46.0 48.1 40.8 47.5 
     USA 63.7 57.2 62.2 64.1 53.2 45.6 47.6 40.8 47.5 
Latin America 3.0 5.3 3.8 2.3 1.5 2.4 3.6 1.4 2.4 
     Brazil 1.1 3.1 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 2.8 0.2 0.1 
Asia 10.8 12.9 18.6 15.9 27.3 33.3 21.3 30.5 36.0 
     China 3.6 4.9 12.7 4.0 7.4 20.8 10.5 13.5 23.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.5 1.4 1.3 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.7 
     South Africa 0.0 1.1 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 
Others 0.0 1.1 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 
          
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:   IMF Direction of Trade   
 
 All quantitative restrictions have been eliminated. Licensing is required for all 
trade activities but they are granted almost automatically.  However, bureaucratic delays 
and corruption can be an issue and have been known to cause significant delays in some 
instances.  Importation of certain products (transmitters, receivers, explosives, plants, 
fruits, seeds, drugs, etc) require ministerial permit. In 2001, the Government introduced a 
Customs Expansion and Modernization Project to improve customs administration.  The 
Project has been implemented in collaboration with the Crown Agent, a consulting 
company.  Most products require pre-shipment inspection that is provided by BIVAC 
Standards. There is no export incentives system in place (duty drawback, bonded 
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warehousing, export processing zones, etc.) but investment goods in the oil and mining 
sectors are exempted from import duties.       
 
Table 3:  Sources of  Imports (percent) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Economic Union 60.4 50.0 29.1 31.8 44.9 46.2 37.9 45.8 51.6 
     Portugal 19.8 20.6 19.9 20.0 14.3 16.8 13.8 18.7 17.7 
North America 15.2 14.1 12.4 17.6 12.7 11.6 8.6 13.1 12.2 
     USA 15.0 13.9 12.1 17.3 12.3 10.8 8.5 12.9 11.8 
Latin America 2.3 3.9 3.7 6.7 3.5 5.9 5.0 8.2 7.4 
     Brazil 1.2 1.8 3.5 5.9 3.1 5.2 4.4 6.9 5.6 
Asia 9.4 9.0 19.9 9.2 19.5 9.5 28.0 8.7 11.1 
     China 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.8 0.8 1.7 1.4 2.1 3.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 10.7 21.6 6.1 7.8 12.3 20.8 16.2 18.7 14.9 
     South Africa 8.6 19.7 4.7 6.1 10.3 16.8 12.9 15.7 13.2 
Others 2.0 1.5 28.8 26.9 7.2 6.0 4.2 5.4 2.8 
          
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:   IMF Direction of Trade   
 
 Figure 2 shows the structure of Angola’s existing tariff schedule.  It is clear that a 
large number of tariff lines are at what could be considered “nuisance”  levels of 2% 
and 5%.  Overall, very few items are taxed at the highest levels.  This, together with the 
lack of quantitative restrictions noted above, indicates that trade policy is not a major 
impediment to Angola’s integration into the world economy. 
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Figure 2 
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 Growth in GDP over the past 10 years (See Table 4)  has been anemic at best, and 
negative in many years.  Only when oil prices and/or production rise does growth rise 
as well, reflecting the extreme oil dependence of the Angolan economy.  This situation 
was in fact almost inevitable over the many years of conflict, when production in rural 
areas was virtually impossible and cities were cut off from both sources of supply and 
potential markets for manufactures.  Now that hostilities have ended, growth in non-oil 
sectors has slowly started to rebound but oil remains dominant.  Recent oil price 
increases to more than $60 per barrel will provide additional growth if they are 
sustained.3 
                                                 
 
3 Data collection systems are extremely deficient, particularly outside of Luanda, making reported figures 
difficult to rely on.  The government’s statistical network is largely non-existent outside of major cities, 
with even the size of the population a subject of some debate.  Oil production estimates are better known, 
though the disposition of oil receipts has been a major bone of contention between the government and 
international lending institutions.  Allegations of huge diversions have been made but verification of these 
claims has been difficult.  Recent moves toward more transparency are very welcome, but do little to 
improve historical information.  
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 From independence in 1975 until the past few years Angola went through a series 
of hyperinflationary episodes followed by stabilization/control policy packages and 
then renewed inflation.  The root cause of these cycles was monetization of fiscal 
deficits.   Spending fueled by oil receipts would be unsustainable after a period of 
growth, with declining oil receipts from either production declines or adverse price 
movements  triggering the need to print money, or to borrow against future oil receipts. 
 Relations with international organizations were uneven through these episodes, as 
the government proved unable to adhere to the terms required by the IMF for approval.  
However, over the past year the government has shown a renewed determination to 
achieve stability and to do whatever is necessary to normalize relations with the IMF, 
the World Bank, and other donors.  Recent announcements regarding oil-related 
receipts are a break with the past and could, if continued and extended sector-wide, 
provide the basis for a sustained move to a more transparent mode of operation. 
 
III.  What To Do With the Oil Receipts? 
 
 Clearly, Angola’s exports will be dominated by oil and oil products (and 
diamonds to a lesser extent) over the next decade.  However, current reserves and 
production trends indicate that there will be a peak in production at some point in the 
decade between 2010 and 2020.  (See the World Bank’s  2006 Country Economic 
Memorandum for Angola and supporting analytical work for details).  This indicates that 
the most immediate task is the definition of an optimal policy for extraction of mineral 
wealth and for the disposition of the revenue generated from them.   
 
 Several recent examples of petroleum revenue funds designed to optimize the 
intertemporal profile of revenue generation and expenditure exist in the literature and 
have been discussed at some length in the 2006 Angola CEM as well as in various other 
publications such as various studies published under IMF auspices.  (See for example, 
Menachem Katz, Ulrich Bartsch, Harinder Malothra and Milan Cuc “Lifting the Oil 
Curse – Improving Petroleum Revenue Management in Sub Saharan Africa, IMF 2004) 
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 Table 4  ANGOLA:  Gross Domestic Product, 1997-2002 (annual rate of change) 
       
       1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 Annual Rate of Change 
 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
 
      
      
         
      
      
      
       
       
       
     
      
      
      
      
     
      
      
      
       
     
       
      
      
10.2 5.2 1.3 9.3 18.0 12.1
Mining 6.5 8.1 4.7 2.0 1.8 22.0
Crude and Gas
 
4.7 3.5 1.0 0.4 (1.0) 25.0
Other 53.4 90.2 39.5 13.3 19.5 6.6
Manufacturing Industries 9.3 4.9 7.1 8.9 9.8 10.1
Electricity Industry 9.4 14.5 1.3 0.8 10.0 10.0
Construction 13.0 10.0 5.0 7.5 8.5 10.0
Trade Services 9.4 5.0 4.4 3.4 6.0 11.6
Non- Trade Services 5.5 0.0 (7.5) 1.5 1.0 2.5
Impor customs duties 5.0 (30.0) (10.0) 0.0 2.5 5.0
GDP at Market Prices 
 
7.7 5.5 2.7 3.6 5.2 15.5
 Index (1992=100) 
 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing
 
89.2 93.9 95.1 104.0 122.6 137.5
Mining 127.6 137.9 144.4 147.2 149.9 182.9
Crude and Gas 
 
129.4 133.9 135.3 135.8 134.4 168.0
Other 102.4 194.8 271.7 307.8 367.8 392.0
Manufacturing Industries 103.0 108.1 115.8 126.0 138.4 152.4
Electricity Industry 116.6 133.4 135.2 136.3 149.9 164.9
Construction 89.1 98.1 103.0 110.7 120.1 132.1
Trade Services 101.9 107.0 111.6 115.4 122.3 136.5
Non- Trade Services 71.3 71.3 66.0 67.0 67.6 69.3
Import customs duties 53.9 37.8 34.0 34.0 34.8 36.6
GDP at Market Prices 102.2 107.8 110.7 114.7 120.8 139.5
Source:  Banco Nacional de Angola.     
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 Standard macroeconomic analyses of the resource curse indicate that there is a 
strong incentive for countries to use oil proceeds to invest in their economies in such a 
way that the eventual downward trend of mineral receipts can be offset by increasing 
production from other sectors.  This means investing in sectors in which Angola has a 
potential or actual comparative advantage and which could become leading export sectors 
in the absence of mineral income. 
 
 In the Angolan case there are several areas where there is potential for investment 
in efficient import substituting domestic production, given the virtual total collapse of 
many parts of the domestic economy during the recurrent periods of conflict after 
independence.  Replacement of destroyed or degraded infrastructure is obviously high on 
the list, and is in fact already underway in many parts of the country.  In sectoral terms it 
is apparent that Angola can produce far more of its food and fiber needs than was 
possible during the war years.  Similarly, restoration of peace and basic infrastructure and 
utilities will enable the rehabilitation of light manufacturing in many areas where imports 
are currently dominant. 
 
 The overvaluation of the Kwanza discussed above will complicate the process of 
re-establishing such import-competing activities, and is a prime reason for the emphasis 
on good exchange rate management as a prerequisite for Angola to turn its current trade 
deficit into a more nearly balanced account.   Continuing overvaluation will likely result 
in pressure to provide tariff protection to agriculture and other trade exposed sectors; 
indeed this has already occurred in the most recent adjustment of import duties. 
 
 It will be argued by some that this protection is necessary for the country to avoid 
a future in which oil revenues start to decline while no other export sector is capable of 
generating needed revenue.  History and economics both suggest that a far more desirable 
outcome would be the preservation of incentives via avoidance of adverse 
macroeconomic incentives rather than the institution of narrow protection through taxes 
on international trade. 
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 In the long run Angola’s potential comparative advantage in producing surplus 
food for export, particularly maize, makes the potential for regional trade integration of 
real value.  The SADCC region contains several chronic food deficit countries, all of 
which prefer maize as a staple source of calories.  Angola could be the residual supplier 
of needed imports as well as being an exporter of various other food and fiber products. 
 
IV.  Policy Recommendations 
 
All observers of the Angolan economy agree that the objective of economic 
policy is to accelerate growth and alleviate poverty by restoring the diversity and 
dynamism the economy had before independence. This dictates a carefully phased trade 
strategy that aims initially for import-substitution (investment in import-replacing 
activities) in sectors where Angola has proven comparative advantage and in sectors 
where Angola used to be a major producer before independence. Food security will be 
high up on the import-substitution agenda given Angola’s status as a low cost food 
producer capable not only of efficient satisfaction of domestic needs but also as a 
competitive producer of food for the international market.  It must be remembered that 
Angola’s current need to engage in import substitution stems from the entirely non-
economic reasons for its loss of domestic production capacity in the first place – the 
decades long civil war and its attendant destruction. 
 
Once production for the domestic market has been reactivated production for the 
regional or global market will be the next step.   The emphasis on eventual export-led 
growth is essential in Angola because with more than two-thirds of the population living 
on less than $1.70 a day4, Angola’s domestic market is too small to support the sustained 
high growth in production and employment necessary to make a marked reduction in 
poverty.  Therefore, export growth and diversification must be the focus for generating 
growth in Angola in the medium to longer-term.   
 
                                                 
4 Estrategia de Combate a Pobreza, page 2.  Based on 2001 survey 
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Angola has substantial potential to implement the proposed phased strategy that 
initially focuses on import substitution with the intention of eventually moving towards 
export-led growth within a diversified economy.  In particular, opportunities exist in 
agriculture (horticultural crops, maize, livestock, potatoes, etc.), fisheries, light 
manufacturing (agro-processing, wood products, leather products), and services (port 
services and transit trade, tourism).  This strategy would provide the most effective anti-
poverty program because all potential import-substitution and export-oriented activities, 
particularly in the rural areas where about two-thirds of the population live, are labor-
intensive activities.  
 
As noted above, Angola’s trade policy is not really a major barrier to 
implementation of this policy given the already relatively low tariffs and the lack of any 
quantitative restrictions.  However, a comprehensive reform package is needed which 
would include limiting overvaluation of the exchange rate to the extent possible, 
rehabilitation of infrastructure, further stabilization of the macro economy, the 
strengthening of sector-specific policies, and improvement in the private sector enabling 
environment to encourage private investment in import-substitution and export-oriented 
sectors and a more effective supply-side response to trade policies.  A competitive real 
exchange rate would be the single most important instrument to bring back the diversity 
of production and exports.  While some real appreciation is inevitable given the size of 
oil flows, any steps that can be taken to ameliorate pressures in this direction will be 
helpful to the long term task of maintaining productive capacity in the non-oil sectors. 
 
 

